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ABSTRACT
This thesis considers the problems associated with moving high volumes of
administrative data from afloat units to shore commands. It proposes three alternative
technologies and compares them on the basis of effectiveness, reliability, ease of use, and
cost.
All three alternatives are based on collecting data on a shipboard microcomputer,
compressing it, and transmitting it to a computer bulletin board system ashore where users
can download data via commercial telephone lines. The primary difference between the
three alternatives is in the transmission medium used. The first uses military satellite
channels. The second uses High Frequency radio. The third uses INMARSAT, a
commercial satellite communication system.
AH three alternatives are capable of effectively transferring data, but the best all-
around performance was achieved with the INMARSAT-based system. Further
consideration of variants on the system tested is recommended because the development






B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 1
II. PROBLEMS WITH ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 3
A. TRANSMITTING ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 3
B. VOLUME OF ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 4
C. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CURRENT METHODS 5
D. THE ADVANTAGE OF FINDING ALTERNATIVES 6
III. NEAR TERM ALTERNATIVES 8










E. NEAR TERM SUMMARY 19
IV
IV. A MID-RANGE ALTERNATIVE 21
A. LEASING COMMERCIAL SATELLITES 21
B. INMARSAT 22
1 . INMARSAT Network Configuration 22
C. INMARSAT APPLICATIONS 24
1. SALTS 24
2. S D S A 24
3. S R S 25
D. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA AND INMARSAT 26






2 Per Use Fees 32
H. MID-TERM SUMMARY 32
V. ALTERNATIVE COMPARISON 35
A. COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES 35




c. Originator or Addressee 37
2. Where To Draw The Line? 37
B. DEMAND FOR RESOURCES 38
1 . Personnel Data 38
v
C. COMPARING THE CAPACITIES OF ALTERNATIVES ... 39




5. Capacity Summary 42
D. COMPARING THE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVES 42
1. Cost Definitions 43
2. Uncertainty of HF Costs 44
E. IMPLEMENTATION DRAWBACKS 45
1 . FLTSATCOM 45
2 . INMARSAT 45
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47
A. CONCLUSIONS 48
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 48
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 4 9
LIST OF REFERENCES 50
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 51
VI
I . INTRODUCTION
Surface ships at sea are responsible for handling and
transferring large volumes of administrative data, even under
the most demanding operational conditions. The ill effects of
this burden on both combat efficiency and the efficiency of
the Naval Telecommunication System are numerous. They include
reduced personnel efficiency and lengthy delays for both
tactical and non-tactical data being transferred ashore.
A. OBJECTIVE
Technologies that can transfer administrative data more
efficiently are currently available in the private sector.
The objective of this thesis is to compare three candidate
technologies that could improve the transfer of data and
identify the best one based on reliability, ease of use, and
relative cost. Data was derived primarily from studies by the
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command and the Naval
Electronic Systems Engineering Center.
B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II of this study discusses problems associated
with current methods of handling administrative data. Chapter
III describes two attempts to use existing communication
systems to move administrative data more efficiently. Chapter
IV describes an alternative that uses commercial satellite
services to transfer data. Chapter V compares the three
alternatives in terms of capacity and cost. Lastly Chapter VI
presents conclusions and recommends a possible direction for
the future
.
All of the alternative systems presented are capable of
transferring data efficiently, but of the three, the best
combination of low relative cost and high performance is
achieved with the commercial satellite option described in
Chapter IV. The result of this study is a recommendation to
consider using commercial satellite services to transfer
administrative data ashore on a battle group level.
II. PROBLEMS WITH ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
For the purposes of this analysis, administrative data is
considered as information that does not relate directly to the
command and control of naval forces at sea. Some
administrative data is vital to the effective functioning of
naval forces
.
Examples of administrative data that must be passed to and
from ships while at sea include: supply inventory data,
supply requisition data, ship's maintenance and repair data,
aircraft maintenance data, ship's budget and financial data,
personnel and pay data, medical data, and safety data. (Space
and Naval Warfare Systems, April '91, Encl . 2) Within each of
these categories, there is a wide range of urgency associated
with given pieces of information.
A. TRANSMITTING ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
Ships currently transfer administrative data to commands
ashore by a variety of means, usually dictated by the
recipients . Some data is sent by mail or courier, often
incurring delays as long as one month, which is not always
acceptable for some types of data. Some data is sent by naval
message where it competes indirectly with higher priority
tactical data for communications resources (NAVELEX, Vallejo,
December '90, p. 2) . The burden of handling these additional
messages reduces the efficiency of tactical communication
channels. During times of heavy traffic, these low priority
messages can suffer delays as long as five days (Space and
Naval Warfare Systems, February '91, p. 1-1).
B. VOLUME OF ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
There are over 33,000 commands ashore that can send
messages to a commander at sea (Space and Electronic Warfare,
'91, p. 7) . The vast majority of them are not involved in
tactical command and control issues.
Today, 98% of all ship-to-shore message traffic is sent
via satellite networks such as the Fleet Satellite Broadcast
and the Common User Digital Information Exchange Subsystem
(CUDIXS) . In 1990, 54.6% of all traffic on the Fleet
Satellite Broadcast and 50.1% of the traffic on CUDIXS was
made up of unclassified messages, many of which were no doubt
administrative in nature. (Space and Naval Warfare Systems,
February '91, p. C-l)
Military satellite channels routinely operate at or near
capacity, even during peacetime. During times of crisis when
activity is high or MINIMIZE is imposed, tactical and
administrative messages alike experience lengthy delays.
(Space and Naval Warfare Systems, April '91, Enclosure 2, p.
1)
The evolution of Over The Horizon Targeting brings the
need to transfer even more information between ships over
longer distances. This places more demand on already burdened
satellite channels and causes longer delays for all users.
C. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CURRENT METHODS
Current methods of transferring data are based on a
communications architecture that was designed decades ago.
Today's users expect a level of service that pushes the limits
of the existing communications structure. These structural
limitations result in an array of symptoms that appear as
inadequacies in distribution, throughput, and speed of
service
.
Tactical satellite networks are unable to effectively
segregate operational traffic from less critical
administrative traffic. Messages are separated by their
assigned precedence and handled on a first in, first out basis
within those categories. In afloat message centers, vital
tactical messages on ship's movement or weapons employment are
often obscured in a sea of messages on the availability of
uniform items or proper storage temperatures for fresh
vegetables
.
Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that long periods of
MINIMIZE can bring non-tactical support activities to a
standstill. (Space and Naval Warfare Systems, April '91, p.
1) Thousands of commands ashore that are trying to improve
fleet readiness ultimately reduce combat efficiency by
inadvertently slowing down the command and control process.
Night intentions messages from the Battle Group Commander are
losing the fight against urinalysis test results.
D. THE ADVANTAGE OF FINDING ALTERNATIVES
There are several alternatives to handling administrative
data by the current methods; some of them will be described in
this thesis. The most visible advantage that would result
from most of them is the increased speed with which
administrative data would be received ashore. The delays of
weeks or days that are currently accepted could be reduced to
hours and minutes. This would result in more accurate data
bases for the Navy's shore establishment and, hopefully,
better service for the forces afloat.
If requisitions were received ashore faster, repair parts
might reach ships at sea sooner. If shipyards could receive
work orders and technical drawings faster, they might begin
planning repairs sooner and be ready to start work as soon as
a ship reached port . Better management of administrative
information could result in improved fleet readiness. (Space
and Naval Warfare Systems, February '91, p. 6-7)
In addition, removing administrative data from over-
burdened tactical channels would improve the performance of
these channels. The reduced volume would allow existing
systems to deliver higher throughput and speed.
Placing only tactical data on tactical channels would also
streamline the distribution process, helping users manage
information more efficiently. The liberated capacity would
allow satellite channels to accommodate growth in tactical
message traffic, due to the advent of over the horizon
targetting, without degrading performance.
III. NEAR TERM ALTERNATIVES
The problems caused by transmitting a high volume of
administrative data over tactical channels are pressing. A
complete and effective solution will take time to design and
even longer to implement. The Navy has made efforts on many
levels to provide some slight relief at low cost in the near
term.
The Bureau of Personnel and the Naval Aviation Support
Office have each developed separate systems to try and remove
some of their data from conventional Navy channels. The Naval
Electronic Systems Engineering Center has experimented with
two systems that might help the entire Navy to use
conventional channels more efficiently.
A. USING EXISTING CHANNELS BETTER
The Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center in
Vallejo, California (NAVELEX, Vallejo) , conducted tests on
transferring administrative data in 1990. The tests evaluated
alternative uses of both the Fleet Satellite Communications
System (FLTSATCOM) and conventional high frequency radio
channels (HF) . All tests were conducted using standard
shipboard equipment and commercial off-the-shelf hardware and
software
.
Data transferred came from four different computer-based
management information systems found aboard ship. There were
requisitions and accounting data from the Shipboard Non-
tactical Automated Data Processing Program (SNAP) . There was
pay and personnel data from the Uniform Microcomputer
Disbursing System (UMIDS) . There was maintenance and repair
data from the Maintenance and Repair Management System (MRMS)
.
And there was meteorological data from the Tactical
Environmental Support System (TESS)
.
The FLTSATCOM portion of the test was conducted between
USS RANGER (CV-61) and NARDAC San Diego, while the HF portion
was conducted between USS FREDERICK (LST-1184) and NARDAC San
Diego. In the test, the administrative data was collected on
a floppy disk, and rather than being formatted into a hard-
copy narrative message, it was loaded onto a dedicated PC and
compressed.
1 . FLTSATCOM
In the FLTSATCOM portion of the test, the compressed
data was electronically transferred to an AN/WSC-3 transceiver
through an Advanced Narrow-band Digital Voice Terminal
(ANDVT) . The ANDVT was used to provide encryption and as an
adapter since the output port on the PC was not compatible
with the input ports on the AN/WSC-3 . The transceiver
transmitted the data to NAVCOMTELSTA Stockton via FLTSATCOM
where it was received on another AN/WSC-3. Upon receipt, the
data was electronically transferred to a PC through an ANDVT
.
At the PC, an operator transferred the files to a computer
bulletin board system (BBS) at NARDAC San Diego over land-
based commercial telephone lines (see Figure 1) .
Test files were compressed using a commercial
compression software called PKZip which achieves a 70%
compression ratio. Data transfers were conducted successfully
at 2,400 bits per second. Most test files were limited to not
more than 720 characters, although files of 2,182 and 43,000
characters were transferred without error. (NAVELEX, Vallejo,
December '90, pp. 16-17)
2. HF
In the HF portion of the test, the compressed data was
sent to an HF modem through a KG-84C encryption set and
transmitted on an AN/URT-23. NAVCOMTELSTA Stockton received
the transmission on an AN/URT-23. The transmission was
demodulated with an HF modem and decrypted with a KG-84C. The
data was loaded onto a PC that automatically transferred the
data to a BBS at NARDAC San Diego via land-based commercial
telephone lines (see Figure 2)
.
Testing was done both inport and at sea at ranges
exceeding 800 nautical miles. Test files were compressed by
70% using PKZip and transmitted at 2,400 bits per second. The
average file size was 6,343 characters. The equipment
automatically aborted the transfer if the channel conditions
10
Figure 1: FLTSATCOM equipment configuration.









Figure 2: HF equipment configuration.
(NAVELEX, Vallejo, December '90, p. 8)
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would not support error-free communication; as a result it
took 104 attempts to successfully transfer 83 files.
At NARDAC San Diego, the BBS stored the files. Users
who needed the data could use a modem to dial up over land-
based commercial telephone lines to download the files that
they needed (see Figure 3). (NAVELEX, Vallejo, December '90,
p. 8)
B . ADVANTAGES
The primary benefit of these two techniques is in
simplified message handling both aboard ship and ashore.
Rather than producing narrative reports, managers for systems
like SNAP or TESS could submit a floppy disk once a day that
could be easily and automatically transmitted to a BBS. End
users could then download data at their leisure. There would
be no need for proofreading, retyping, message sorting, or
delivering messages to the end users.
The communication channel (satellite or HF) realizes some
relief because the compressed data takes less time to transmit
than the uncompressed text . The compression rate is the
percent reduction in message length over the uncompressed
original. If data is compressed with a 70% compression rate,
the compressed data is encoded in 30% as many bits as the
original. (NOSC, August '89, pp. 3-5)
Administrative reports would no longer be limited to a
narrative format. Since the data is being submitted and
13
Figure 3: BBS configuration.
(NAVELEX, Vallejo, December '90, p. 9)
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transferred as a binary file, graphs and drawings are easily
accommodated. This is invaluable when requesting repairs or
submitting work packages as with MRMS
.
The FLTSATCOM system tested saw no increase in data rate
over the traditional FLTSATCOM configuration except as
achieved through data compression. However, the HF system
tested achieved a substantial increase in data rate from 75
bits per second for traditional HF systems to 2,400 bits per
second by using a high speed HF modem.
C . DRAWBACKS
Both systems tested are capable of providing reliable data
transfers in a wide range of conditions. However, this was a
preliminary attempt and was not without its shortcomings.
1 . FLTSATCOM
Satellite channels and shipboard transceivers are in
short supply, and this alternative does little to relieve
that. This alternative still leaves tactical and non-tactical
traffic in indirect competition for the same channels. In
addition, no automated switching system exists to interface
transmissions received at the NAVCOMTELSTA with land-based
commercial telephone networks; this currently requires




Shore-based HF receiving sites are often in remote
overseas locations and cannot make connections to U.S.
15
commercial telephone networks that would support data
transfers (Space and Naval Warfare Systems, February '91, p.
6-2)
. Although there has been extensive investment in the
infrastructure to support HF communication systems over the
years, the possibility exists that the Navy will phase out the
use of HF systems in the future (Space and Naval Warfare
Systems, February '91, p. 6-2). That would make this
alternative much less attractive.
D . COSTS
Cost data supplied by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command uses the following assumptions:
• Ten year life-cycle for all alternatives.
• All currently owned equipments represent sunk costs and
are not considered in this analysis.
• Only the cost of personnel requirements above current
levels is considered here.
• Costs include 60 minutes of data transmission every day
for each of 300 ships.
• Yearly maintenance costs are estimated at 15% of initial
hardware cost. (Space and Naval Warfare Systems, February
'91, p. 6-3)
1 . FLTSATCOM
Costs for the FLTSATCOM option include providing all
300 ships with access to DAMA channels as well as operation of
the necessary facilities ashore. Non-recurring costs
($2,150,000) include the costs of new construction needed to
support the alternative. Initial equipment costs
16
($139,976,000) include the purchase of shipboard equipment
required for DAMA access, as well as the computers and
software needed aboard ship and ashore. Installation costs
($52,085,000) include the cost of performing shipboard

















(Space and Naval Warfare Systems, February '91, p. E-2)
Operating costs ($118,854,000) include the cost of
additional manning at NAVCOMTELSTAs as well as commercial
telephone fees over the ten year life-cycle of the proposed
alternative. Additional manning includes one required
watchstander for each NAVCOMTELSTA to transfer received
17
transmissions to commercial telephone networks. Maintenance
costs ($160,350,000) are estimated to cover the life-cycle
costs for all new hardware purchased. Training costs
($4,205,000) include the life-cycle costs of instructing
personnel on operating procedures. Operating, maintenance,
and training costs have been discounted using a 6.25% discount
rate over the lifetime of the alternative.
2. HF
The costs indicated here do not include the cost of
providing all shore receiving sites with data-grade
connections to U.S. commercial telephone networks which
represents a considerable expense. The only additional
equipment considered here is the HF modems that will be
required aboard ship as well as at the shore receiving sites.
There are no non-recurring costs because no new construction
is needed to support this alternative. Initial equipment
costs ($11,599,000) include the purchase of HF modems as well
as the computers and software needed aboard ship and ashore.
Installation costs ($5,010,000) include the cost of performing
shipboard alterations required for new equipment.
Operating costs ($45,270,000) include the cost of
additional manning ashore as well as commercial telephone fees
over the ten year life-cycle of the proposed system.
Maintenance costs ($33,225,000) are estimated to cover the
life-cycle costs for all new hardware purchased. Training
18
costs ($4,405,000) include the life-cycle costs of instructing
personnel on operating procedures (see Table 2) . Operating,
maintenance, and training costs were discounted using a 6.25%















(Space and Naval Warfare Systems, February '91, p. G-l)
E. NEAR TERM SUMMARY
Both of the proposed systems described in this chapter use
communication channels more efficiently and give users more
flexibility. They are innovative attempts to ease the burden
of transmitting administrative data. Unfortunately the costs
involved and the long lead times required for fleet-wide
19
implementation are not justified by the minor improvements to
message traffic congestion.
20
IV. A MID-RANGE ALTERNATIVE
Presumably with more time, better solutions can be
implemented. An approach that may yield results lies in the
use of commercial communication services
.
A. LEASING COMMERCIAL SATELLITES
Many private businesses and several government agencies
lease channels on commercial satellites to fill some of their
communications needs . The Navy has long experience with
satellite leasing, having first contracted with the COMSAT
Corporation for the Gapfiller system in 1976. There is also
an ongoing contract started in 1984 for the Leased Satellite
(LEASAT) System.
LEASAT is owned and operated by Hughes Communications
Services Incorporated and supports both the Navy and Air Force
by transmitting voice and record traffic. LEASAT employs
Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) and supports such vital
tactical networks as the Fleet Satellite Broadcast, the Common
User Digital Information Exchange Subsystem (CUDIXS) , the
Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange Subsystem
(OTCIXS) , and the Submarine Satellite Information Exchange
Subsystem (SSIXS) . (NOSC, August '84, p. 74)
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B . INMARSAT
INMARSAT (International Maritime Satellite Organization)
provides satellite services to nearly 10,000 vessels from 55
different countries. The satellites support direct dial
telephone, facsimile, and data communication service to mobile
subscribers both ashore and at sea. COMSAT is INMARSAT'S U.S.
representative and largest shareholder. COMSAT offers
telephone, telex, and data communication services to ships,
off-shore oil platforms, and land-based mobile users.
(COMSAT, March '89, p. 2)
INMARSAT has been the primary communication system for the
Military Sealift Command since 1989. Additionally, there are
28 combatant ships in the Navy that are currently INMARSAT
equipped; they use the system primarily for direct dial voice
telephone service. The list of the Navy's INMARSAT-equipped
ships includes 15 CVs, 5 LCCs or other flagships, and 3
tenders or repair ships. (Space and Naval Warfare Systems,
February '91, p. B-l)
1 . INMARSAT Network Configuration
The INMARSAT network is composed of a ground segment,
a space segment, and a shipboard segment. On the ground,
COMSAT operates two earth stations that receive the down-link
signal from the satellites and establish circuits with land-
based commercial telephone, telex and data networks. One
22
earth station is in Southbury, Connecticut; the other is in
Santa Paula, California. (COMSAT, March '89, p. 3)
In space, INMARSAT has a constellation of three
satellites in geosynchronous orbit 22,300 miles above the
equator. These three satellites have provided world-wide
coverage since 1982. They use SHF (Super High Frequency)
transceivers and employ circuit switching technology. The
system can support 335 channels simultaneously, each with a
bandwidth of 3 KHz. By 1995, the organization plans to
introduce INMARSAT 2 which will feature a constellation of
four improved satellites. The new satellites will increase
the speed of the standard data service from 4,800 bits per
second to 9, 600 bits per second as well as offer expanded
customer services. (Space and Naval Warfare Systems, February
'91, p. 3-2)
The shipboard segment comes in two variants; the
configuration of interest here is the Standard-A system. The
Standard-A terminal provides full telephone, data and telex
service and has two primary components. The above-deck
component is a gyro-stabilized radome that houses the
transceiver and an 85 centimeter antenna. The below-deck
component houses the terminal itself and associated
communications hardware such as dial telephones, modems or
facsimile machines. (COMSAT, March '89, p. 3)
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C. INMARSAT APPLICATIONS
There are many initiatives already underway in the fleet
to apply INMARSAT capabilities to satisfy communication needs.
The Naval Aviation Support Office (ASO) in Philadelphia, the
Bureau of Personnel (BuPers) , and the Navy Broadcast System
are all using INMARSAT capabilities to improve their
operations. During Operation Desert Storm, many Navy and
Marine Corps commands made use of INMARSAT to pass time-
sensitive logistics and personnel data while MINIMIZE was
imposed. (Naval Supply Systems, April '91, p. 5)
1. SALTS
ASO Philadelphia developed SALTS (Streamlined
Alternative Logistics Transmission System) to allow INMARSAT-
equipped ships to send them aircraft maintenance data more
efficiently. They used standard, commercially-available
hardware and software to transmit data from ships at sea to a
computer bulletin board in their offices via INMARSAT.
SALTS normally operates at a data rate of 9,600 bits
per second. The whole system was designed in three weeks, and
they were able to equip each ship involved with a PC, a modem,
and all required software for $ 6,000. (BuPers, May '91, p.
1)
2. S D S A
The Bureau of Personnel is experimenting with SDSA
(Source Data System Afloat) . It has installed a PC-based
24
system that can tie the USS Ticonderoga into the Source Data
System network using UMIDS or an INMARSAT terminal . The
Source Data System (SDS) is a data processing system designed
to improve pay and personnel services by automating the
maintenance and submission of data to the Navy's pay and
personnel databases
.
SDS provides automation for 75% to 80% of shipboard
personnel office functions including the exchange of
information between personnel and disbursing offices. With
the exception of USS Ticonderoga, all ships must perform
personnel transactions manually and communicate with BuPers
either with awkward OCR forms which are sent through the mail
or with naval messages. The SDSA experiment has been
acknowledged by CINCLANTFLT to reduce message traffic
congestion, increase personnel office productivity, and
improve the quality of service. (BuPers, April '91, p. A-2)
3. S R S
The Navy Broadcast System (NBS) produces and transmits
entertainment programming of the Armed Forces Radio and
Television Service (AFRTS) . In 1988, NBS stopped transmitting
its audio programming via shortwave radio and began
transmitting on a downlink channel of the INMARSAT system to
improve signal quality. In order to receive these
transmissions, ships at sea must be outfitted with a Standard-
A terminal which NBS calls a Shipboard Receiving System (SRS)
.
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NBS began installing SRSs in a receive only
configuration in 1990. The current plan is to install SRS in
285 ships with subsequent upgrade to a transmit/receive
capability under review by the Chief of Naval Operations.
(Space and Naval Warfare Systems, February '91, p. 1-4)
The SRS program will cause a marked increase in the
number of INMARSAT-equipped ships in the fleet . This should
significantly decrease the calculated cost of any other
INMARSAT-related programs underway.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE DATA AND INMARSAT
In 1990 NAVELEX, Vallejo tested the effectiveness of the
INMARSAT system at transferring administrative data. It
collected data from SNAP, UMIDS, MRMS and TESS and transferred
them to a PC on a floppy disk. The data was then compressed
using PKzip and transmitted through the INMARSAT system using
a conventional modem and a Standard-A terminal. Upon receipt
at the COMSAT ground station, the data was automatically
transmitted to a computer bulletin board at NARDAC San Diego
via land-based commercial telephone lines. Shore-based
commands that needed the data could then dial up and download
the files that they needed (see Figure 4) . (NAVELEX, Vallejo,
December '90, p. 6)
The INMARSAT testing took place onboard USS RANGER, USS
LEXINGTON, USS CAPE COD, and USS INDEPENDENCE. Data was
routed through the ground stations at both Southbury,
26
Figure 4: INMARSAT equipment configuration.
(NAVELEX, Vallejo, December '90, p. 6)
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Connecticut, and Santa Paula, California. A variety of
conditions were encountered both inport and at sea. All files
sent were received without error.
The average size of the test files before compression was
399 kilobytes while the average file size after compression
was 72 kilobytes. The largest file transferred was 7.4
megabytes before compression and 1.3 megabytes after
compression. The average throughput achieved was 210
characters per second while transmitting at 2,400 bits per
second, 410 characters per second at 4,800 bits per second,
and 850 characters per second at 9,600 bits per second (see
Table 3)
.
A total of 1,896 files were sent; 1,714 at 2,400 bits per
second, 172 at 4,800 bits per second, and 10 at 9,600 bits per
second (see Table 3) . A document containing combined text and
graphics was transmitted at both 2,400 and 4,800 bits per
second. The quality of the received document was equivalent
to a facsimile sent over commercial telephone lines and was
acceptable to users. All end users reported receiving usable
data, although in some cases the format differed from that






# of Files Sent Avg . Throughput
2400 bps 1714 210 char. / sec.
4800 bps 172 410 char. / sec.
9600 bps 10 850 char. / sec.
E . ADVANTAGES
The technique utilized by NAVELEX, Vallejo, greatly
simplifies the required message handling both aboard ship and
ashore. The entire process is automated from the moment the
ship transmits the data to the moment that the end user dials
in to receive the data.
Perhaps most important, it removes administrative data
from tactical circuits. This would free up traditional
communication resources for more pressing tactical
applications. It would also result in administrative data
reaching users more quickly since the data would no longer
have to compete with messages of higher precedence or travel
through the mail.
Administrative reports would no longer be limited to a
narrative format. Since the data is being submitted and
29
transferred as a binary file, graphs and drawings are easily
accommodated. This is invaluable when requesting repairs or
submitting work packages as with MRMS
.
r . DRAWBACKS
The drawbacks to this option lay mostly in developing
effective billing procedures. If individual ships are billed
for their rates of usage, they may become less willing to
respond to requests for data from shore commands. If shore
commands are billed for the cost of transmitting data that
they request, accounting procedures may become unwieldy.
Lastly, if the Navy leases channels full time, elaborate
scheduling procedures would be needed to ensure each ship fair
access to the system.
G. COSTS
Cost data supplied by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command uses the following assumptions:
• Ten year life-cycle for all alternatives.
• All currently owned equipments represent sunk costs and
are not considered in this analysis.
• Only the cost of personnel requirements above current
levels is considered here.
• Costs include 60 minutes of data transmission every day
for each of 300 ships.
• Yearly maintenance costs are estimated at 15% of initial
hardware cost. (Space and Naval Warfare, February '91, p.
F-2)
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Since the Navy Broadcast System appears to be proceeding
with its SRS program, the Standard-A terminals required for
each ship in the program are considered as currently owned
equipment
.
1 . Dedicated Channels
This option assumes a lease for full time use of
sufficient INMARSAT channel capacity to meet fleet needs . The
Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command estimates that the
fleet would need 60 minutes per day for each of 300 ships.
This figure was arrived at by analyzing current INMARSAT use
by combatant ships and extrapolating to account for additional
transmission requirements. (Space and Naval Warfare Systems,
February '91, p. F-l)
There were no non-recurring costs because no new
construction is required to support this alternative. Initial
equipment costs ($11,750,000) include the purchase of modems
as well as the computers and software needed aboard ship and
ashore. Installation costs ($2,230,000) include the cost of
performing shipboard alterations required for new equipment.
Operating costs ($48,871,500) include the cost of
leasing dedicated satellite channels as well as commercial
telephone fees over the ten year life-cycle of the proposed
system. Maintenance costs ($27,570,000) are estimated to
cover the life-cycle costs for all new hardware purchased.
Training costs ($4,050,000) include the life-cycle costs of
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instructing personnel on operating procedures (see Table 4)
.
(Space and Naval Warfare, February '91, p. F-2) Operating,
maintenance, and training costs have been discounted using a
6.25% discount rate over the lifetime of the alternative.
2 . Per Use Fees
This option assumes that the Navy contracts for
sufficient INMARSAT channel capacity at a rate of $6.25 per
minute. Sufficient capacity is estimated at 18,000 minutes of
satellite time each day (60 minutes a day for each of 300
ships)
. The only difference from the dedicated channel option
lies in the increased operating costs of $118,739,744 which
change because of the different billing scheme (see Table 5) .
H. MID-TERM SUMMARY
The use of INMARSAT to transfer administrative data offers
many unique advantages . It removes a large volume of traffic
from over-laden tactical channels. It removes the burden of
relaying the data from Navy hands entirely. It gives great





INMARSAT Costs (Dedicated channels)
Non-Recurring Cost $
Initial Equipment $ 11,750,000
Installation $ 2,230,000




(Space and Naval Warfare Systems, February '91, p. F-2)
NBS will complete SRS installation in 1993, PC and
bulletin board installation can be completed in a matter of
weeks . With sufficient investment in capital and in new
procedures, this option could greatly improve the speed and
the quality of service of many administrative commands.
Today's technology will allow commercial enterprises, such as
COMSAT and INMARSAT, to provide services that have, until





INMARSAT Costs (Per Use Fees)
Non-Recurring Cost $
Initial Equipment $ 11,750,000
Installation $ 2,230,000




(Space and Naval Warfare Systems, February '91, p. F-2)
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V. ALTERNATIVE COMPARISON
Several alternatives have been presented that attempt to
address a complex problem. In order to view the alternatives
more clearly, some of the issues mentioned earlier are
discussed in more detail below.
A. COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES
As described in Chapter II, from the fleet perspective it
is easy to see that operational data is losing the competition
with administrative data. The sheer volume of administrative
traffic that arrives aboard ship through tactical channels
makes it difficult for users to extract the tactical data that
they need. Yet, the precise extent of the problem is very
difficult to quantify for a number of reasons.
1 . Distinguishing Administrative From Operational
Distinguishing administrative traffic from operational
traffic can be a formidable task. Until one can distinguish
between the two types of messages as they pass through the
Naval Telecommunication System (NTS) , the extent of the
problem cannot be measured. There are several message




The classification assigned to a message provides
a few clues as to its purpose. Many operational messages are
classified and many administrative messages are not, but this
rule is not without its exceptions
.
Mail routing messages and many supply-related
messages must include ship scheduling or location information
that causes them to be classified. Many operational messages
such as engineering or safety information are not classified.
The classification of a message does not reliably distinguish
administrative from operational data.
Jb . Precedence
The precedence assigned to a message also implies
something about the operational nature of its contents. If
users adhered strictly to established procedures, analyzing
the precedence of messages would yield some indication of how
much of the data transferred was actually administrative in
nature, but for a variety of reasons users do not.
Perhaps most of all, users inflate the precedence
assigned to their messages because of the delays they know the
messages will encounter when using the overloaded NTS. Users
also inflate the precedence of messages to help meet deadlines
that are drawing close. The precedence of a message does not
reliably distinguish administrative from operational data.
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c. Originator or Addressee
Analyzing the originator or addressees of a message
offers a rough indication of the nature of a message, but it
clearly does not reveal enough. The vast majority of traffic
released by Commander Carrier Group Four is probably
operational in nature, and the Navy Finance Center rarely
receives anything of tactical interest; but there are frequent
exceptions to these rules, and conclusions derived by this
method could be misleading.
It would also be difficult to consider messages
with multiple or information addressees. How would one
characterize aircraft safety messages sent to address
indicator groups with dozens of addressees from all over the
world? The originator or addressee of a message does not
reliably distinguish administrative from operational data.
2 . Where To Draw The Line?
Analyzing the content of each message could be
deceiving without taking time to consider the appropriate
context. Is a message concerning the transfer of a service
member administrative even if he must be airlifted from a ship
at sea on short notice? Does a discussion of handling fresh
vegetables become operational if it concerns modifying
procedures to speed up the next day's underway replenishment?
The distinction between the administrative and the
operational is not clear cut. Because there has been no
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historic need to make that distinction, the NTS has not
developed an effective mechanism to measure the extent to
which administrative messages have overrun our tactical
circuits
.
B. DEMAND FOR RESOURCES
There is a wide range of shipboard functions that require
the transfer of administrative data ashore. Chapter II
discussed some of those functions and the varied media they
employ. Measuring the demand for NTS assets from all those
functions would go beyond the scope of this analysis. The
next section considers the demand generated by shipboard
personnel functions.
1 . Personnel Data
The Bureau of Personnel currently receives reports of
required transactions from afloat commands via the Diary
Message Reporting System (DMRS) . The DMRS requires that
BuPers be notified by message for over 50 different events
including: arrival or departure from port, reporting or
detaching of personnel, personnel qualifying for selected
watch-stations, reenlistments or extensions, awarding of non-
judicial punishment, and adjusting leave or pay.
Some of these transactions require that additional
documents be forwarded by mail. BuPers receives equivalent
reports from shore commands electronically via the Source Data
System.
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For a cruiser-sized ship with 350 personnel aboard,
the DMRS may require sending as few as three or as many as
seven messages each week. A DMRS message will typically
consist of from three to ten lines of text. At eight bits per
character and 60 characters per line, DMRS generates as few as
4,320 bits per week and as many as 33,600 bits per week. On
average, this ranges from at best 617 bits to a worst case of
4,800 bits per day being transferred ashore by each ship for
personnel functions alone.
C. COMPARING THE CAPACITIES OF ALTERNATIVES
It is difficult to make a fair comparison of all the
alternatives presented because of their fundamental
differences
.
These differences can create hidden imbalances
in the benefits or the costs of an alternative.
There is no way to accurately compute the costs incurred
by receiving data in five days through the current method when
it could have been received in minutes through INMARSAT. It
is very difficult to compute the true cost of sending ship's
maintenance data through a combination of media (mail,
messenger, NTS) in order to compare it with the cost of
sending it through a single electronic medium. There are
inherent flaws in directly comparing a dated technology like
HF radio, which has a limited future, with a newly mature
technology like commercial satellite communications. Without
accounting for the error introduced by such direct
39
comparisons, the capacity of the four alternatives to handle
a worst case of 4,800 bits of personnel data per day from each
of 450 ships, or 2.16 megabits per day is described below.
1 . The Current Method
With the current method (DMRS) , a ship at sea would
report a transaction via naval message with accompanying
documents sent by mail . The message would typically arrive in
one or two days with the documents arriving in about two
weeks. Although the NTS is capable of accommodating the 2.16
megabits per day, it comes at the cost of increasing delays




With the FLTSATCOM alternative, a ship at sea would
record a transaction as a compressed binary file on a floppy
disk and transfer that file to a computer bulletin board
ashore via FLTSATCOM and the nearest Naval Communications
Station. BuPers could then recover the data as needed.
Because of the need for operator action at the
NAVCOMTELSTA to forward the data to the bulletin board, it
would take from a few minutes to an hour for the data to reach
the bulletin board. If BuPers conducted hourly downloads by
phone to collect data from the bulletin board, it would take
a maximum of two hours for the transaction to be received.
Although FLTSATCOM is capable of handling the 2.16 megabits
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per day, even without compression, it would result in
undetermined delays for both operational and administrative
traffic moving through the NTS
.
3. HF
With the HF alternative, a ship at sea would record a
transaction as a compressed binary file on a floppy disk and
transfer that file to a computer bulletin board ashore via HF
radio and the nearest Navy HF receiving site. If BuPers
conducted hourly downloads by phone to collect data from the
bulletin board, it would take a maximum of one hour for the
transaction to be received. Since the HF spectrum is no
longer widely used, this alternative could accommodate the
transfer of 2.16 megabits per day without causing delays for
other traffic.
4 . INMARSAT
With the INMARSAT alternative, a ship at sea would
record a transaction as a binary file on a floppy disk and
transfer it to a computer bulletin board ashore via an
INMARSAT satellite and a COMSAT ground station. If BuPers
conducted hourly downloads by phone to collect data from the
bulletin board, it would take a maximum of one hour for the
transaction to be received. The INMARSAT system can easily
accommodate the transfer of 2.16 megabits per day.
41
5 . Capacity Summary
It is misleading to directly compare the alternatives,
but even at the worst case volume for personnel data of 4,800
bits per day from each of 450 ships, all four alternatives are
capable of transferring sufficient data. Use of the FLTSATCOM
alternative would perpetuate the delays that currently plague
the NTS.
The data compression techniques employed in the
FLTSATCOM, HF and INMARSAT alternatives would reduce the
actual transmitted bit stream by 70% to 1,440 bits per day for
each ship or 648 kilobits per day total. Some of this savings
would probably be taken up in replacing information currently
transferred by mail in documents.
D. COMPARING THE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVES
It is difficult to compare costs between alternatives for
a variety of reasons . In the case of the FLTSATCOM
alternative, the costs include the expense of providing ships
with the equipment necessary to access DAMA channels that
could also be used for tactical applications; but this
capability is not supported by other alternatives . With the
HF alternative, the required shore-based infrastructure is
aging and may not be serviceable beyond the proposed ten year
program life-span; this obstacle to life-cycle extension is
not faced by the other alternatives
.
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In order to justify implementing a new method of
transferring data in today's fiscal environment, it should be
demonstrated that the new method will cost less than the
current method. Unfortunately, no one has been able to
determine the true cost of the current method. The Navy
Computer and Telecommunications Command has never been able to
determine the precise cost of sending a naval message (Suchar,
February '92), and as mentioned above, there is no way of
computing the true cost of delays in the receipt of data.
There can be no direct comparison between current costs and
proposed costs.
1 . Cost Definitions
The cost information used for the FLTSATCOM, HF and
INMARSAT options was provided by the Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command. The data contained some ambiguities and was
not well documented. The following assumptions were used in
interpreting them.
Non-recurring costs reflect the expense of new
facilities and buildings constructed to support the
alternative. Initial equipment costs reflect the expense of
purchasing electronic equipment for installation both aboard
ship and at shore facilities. Installation costs reflect the
expense of planning and conducting the installation of
required electronic equipment. (Space and Naval Warfare
Systems, February '91, p. 6-3)
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Operating costs include the expenses of operating new
electronic equipment in addition to charges for the use of
commercial telephone services
. Maintenance costs were
estimated at 15% of the initial equipment costs for every year
of operation. Training costs include the cost of producing
and distributing training materials throughout the ten year
life-cycle of each alternative (Space and Naval Warfare
Systems, February '91, p. 6-3)
.
Although all federal agencies are required to use a 10%
discount rate when estimating costs, operating maintenance and
training costs were estimated using a 6.25% discount rate
throughout the ten year life-cycle of each alternative. Use
of the 10% discount rate would have resulted in noticeably
lower costs for all three alternatives.
2 . Uncertainty of HF Costs
Many of the Navy's 17 shore HF receiving sites are in
remote overseas locations and do not have direct access to
data-grade commercial telephone lines (Space and Naval Warfare
Systems, February '91, p. 6-2). Providing this data-grade
connectivity represents a significant expense that has not
been included in the cost estimates described above. These
monumental costs and the uncertain future of HF radio in the





The two remaining alternatives, FLTSATCOM and INMARSAT,
are both effective methods for transferring data. Final




The FLTSATCOM alternative is quite expensive with an
estimated total life-cycle cost of $477,620,000 (Space and
Naval Warfare Systems, February '91, p. E-2) . The major cost
contributors to this alternative are the procurement and
installation of equipment required to give ships DAMA access.
Although this alternative would reduce the delays experienced
by some administrative data, there is no getting around the
fact that it leaves administrative and operational data
competing for access to tactical channels.
In addition, no automated system currently exists to
interface transmissions received at the NAVCOMTELSTA with
land-based commercial telephone networks. This introduces the
errors and expenses associated with maintaining an operator on
station, a drawback not presented by the INMARSAT option.
2 . INMARSAT
Two options for INMARSAT use were presented and each
has a unique primary drawback. The Dedicated Channel option,
with a total life-cycle cost of $94,471,500, presented the
challenge of devising and maintaining elaborate transmission
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schedules. The Per Use Fee option, with a total life-cycle
cost of $164,339,744, presented the challenge of devising
effective billing procedures.
A solution recommended by the Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command (SPAWARS) as a cost saving measure may also be
the solution to these drawbacks. SPAWARS recommended a
combination of dedicated channels and per use fees to ensure
sufficient capacity while minimizing costs (Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Command, February '91, p. 6-7).
This combination also yields certain logistic
advantages. With the availability of dedicated channels paid
for by the fleet commander, a simple transmission schedule
that is less than perfect could be implemented. Ships that
were unable to complete the transfer of their required data
during their allotted time-frame would then be able to
transmit at their convenience and pay only for the small
amount of additional air time that they needed. This method
combines the simplified billing scheme of full time dedicated
channels with the flexibility of per use fees.
By combining the two INMARSAT options, all major
drawbacks to this alternative could be overcome. INMARSAT can
reduce the load on burdened tactical circuits at a relatively
low cost while providing vastly improved service to users of
administrative data.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the long-term, there are several alternatives that
could ease the administrative data burden. Increased use of
mail offers some relief as would more aggressive Navy-wide
paperwork reduction programs. The COPERNICUS Architecture, a
plan to move naval communications into the twenty first
century, will also bring some relief.
COPERNICUS will alleviate the administrative data problem
by throttling and tailoring the stream of information ashore
at the Fleet Commander-in-Chief level . It will move data more
efficiently Navy-wide by granting users access to all channels
and media whether they be terrestrial, satellite, or
commercial. Communications resources will be allocated based
on availability, traffic-loading, and precedence, rather than
being dedicated according to function as they are now.
Some of the technologies explored in this analysis can be
applied to improve the Navy' s current communications
architecture, and also be integrated into the COPERNICUS
architecture. Although all of the technologies presented are
capable of reliably transferring administrative data ashore,
some conclusions can be drawn.
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A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions on the relative merits of the
alternatives presented are drawn from the information
presented in this study.
• Current methods of handling administrative data
present a variety of drawbacks that can be overcome by
current technology and that will be unacceptable in the
future
.
• The FLTSATCOM alternative discussed above is capable
of transferring data efficiently, but it does little to
ease the burden on tactical communication channels, and
its cost is too high in comparison with the other
alternatives presented.
• The HF alternative discussed above is capable of
transferring data efficiently, but may require extensive
additional costs in some locations to provide connectivity
ashore with commercial telephone networks; that makes this
alternative undesireable
.
• The INMARSAT alternative discussed above is the best
alternative presented. It is capable of transferring data
efficiently, it can be implemented quickly, and its costs
are low relative to other options; but budgetary
constraints may make even this alternative infeasible.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
Implementation of the INMARSAT alternative would provide
greatly improved logistic and personnel support to the fleet.
It could open the door to innovative developments such as
paperless ships and moving all administrative functions and
personnel ashore.
Use of INMARSAT deserves further consideration in spite of
its costs. With proper study, cost reducing measures such as
collecting data for transfer within a Battle Group via
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cellular phone systems, and then forwarding ashore by one ship
may provide the savings necessary to make this system
affordable
.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research to determine the precise costs of sending
naval messages and of delays in receiving data ashore would be
of great value. This cost information would facilitate
careful analysis of the relative benefits of devising
alternate methods for transferring data.
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